

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Minutes of the Fifth IG/CM Meeting, 3 June 1983

FROM:

C/PB/PPG/OS
4E-70, HQS

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

8 July 1983

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

OC/COMSEC

2.

C/TSD/OS

3.

C/ISSG/OS

4.

C/OS/SAG

5.

DO/CI Staff/

6.

DDI/FICG/

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15.

The only "Action" item for CIA was paragraph 5d, an NSA proposal which would reinstate crypto access procedures which were dropped during the Vietnam era and which would add a polygraph requirement, resources permitting. CIA supports the proposal and is notifying the Secretariat this date.

Yesterday's Sixth IG/CM meeting covered only the Countermeasures Organizational Study. CIA has no action items.

CIA

Interagency Group/Countermeasures

Washington, D.C. 20505

✱ D/ICS-83-0698
20 June 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members and Invitees

25X1 FROM:

[Redacted]
Executive SecretarySUBJECT: Minutes of Fifth IG/CM Meeting,
3 June 198325X1 Attached are the final minutes of the fifth IG/CM meeting. [Redacted]
25X1 [Redacted]Attachment:
a/s25X1 Regraded Unclassified when
attachment is removed.

CONFIDENTIAL

US REGISTRY
[Redacted]

SUMMARY OF IG/CM MEETING

3 JUNE 1983

25X1 1. The fifth IG/CM meeting was convened at 1400 hours, 3 June 1983, by the Chairman (DUSD-Policy), General Richard G. Stilwell, USA (Ret.). A listing of individuals attending is attached. []

2. In his opening remarks, General Stilwell:

25X1 a. Thanked DoJ for hosting the meeting in their new conference room and for providing members the orientation regarding its construction and security features. []

25X1 b. Advised members that the IG/CM-approved OPSEC policy paper had been reviewed by the SIG(I) and passed to the NSC for action. []

25X1 c. Extended, on behalf of all IG/CM members, a formal farewell to [] upon the occasion of his 30 June retirement from active Federal service. The Chairman noted that with [] departure, the Intelligence Community loses a competent and dedicated civil servant. He further noted that [] has been a driving force in the counterintelligence community since the late 1970s and can take much of the credit for elevating counterintelligence to its present national-level attention. As Chief of the Community Counterintelligence Staff and as Executive Secretary to the IG/CM as well as the IG/CI, [] always pushed for what was best for national interest. General Stilwell proffered a collective salute for [] distinguished service with the Intelligence Community. []

25X1 3. The Chairman noted IG/CM member interest in the French expulsion and yielded the floor to [] of CIA for presentation of an informal briefing on the subject. [] advised that his presentation on this principally CI topic had been coordinated with the IG/CI Acting Chairman. Mr. [] discussion covered why the French expulsion occurred, general statements regarding its mechanics, the apparent "domino" effect, the impact on the Soviet intelligence service, and anticipated Soviet counter-actions. 25X1 [] concluded by indicating the expulsion was an effective countermeasure action and by responding to IG/CM member questions. []

4. General Stilwell then called for status reports:

25X1 a. Overflight Policy. The NSC representative, Mr. Kenneth deGraffenreid, advised that Presidential signature on this IG/CM and SIG(I) recommended paper is imminent. []

C O N F I D E N T I A L

b. NSDD-84. DoJ and NSC representatives reported that implementation procedures are still being worked out. Ms. Mary Lawton, DoJ, advised that a small personnel security working group, which includes OPM, is identifying basic issues fundamental to personnel security aspects of the NSDD. The objective is to present an issues option paper to the SIG(I), minus implementation details, for their decision. The NSC member advised that final comments on non-disclosure agreement procedures are due back to the NSC by 17 June. Once these are worked out, a specific education process will be needed on use of the forms (agreements). The internal procedures task group has had to grant extensions to some agencies for submission of their inputs. Primary problems are with those agencies who have never been required to develop such procedures. They may have to receive assistance from more experienced agencies. There was no report on the progress of the media contacts or polygraph task groups. On the latter, Ms. Lawton indicated that DoJ had counseled with OPM and determined that OPM regulations do not preclude use of the polygraph in leak investigations. The "no adverse inference" (from refusal to take the polygraph) ruling will undoubtedly be a problem. [REDACTED]

c. NACSI 4000. The NSA member, [REDACTED] reported that coordination of comments continued and that another status report will be provided at the next meeting. [REDACTED]

d. Embassy Security Enhancement. The State member, Mr. Donald Macdonald, advised that the first meeting of subject working group had been held on 26 May 1983. The group is proceeding with an examination of policy requirements and related considerations which should be formally stated. [REDACTED] CIA, encouraged the working group to review the recommended security enhancement program of 1981 and assess the efficacy of that program. Mr. Macdonald acknowledged that program's probable relevance. He stated there would be another meeting in a month to discuss goals. The Chairman agreed with the course the working group is taking and suggested the overall goal as establishment of a set of policy guidelines, vis-a-vis embassy security, to be implemented when and if funds become available. [REDACTED]

e. Organizational Study. Mr. Britt Snider, OSD, advised that all agency comments on the first draft of the study had been received. He opined that with the exception of some apparent substantive objections on the technical subjects, there did not seem to be any major problems and a second draft would be targeted for member receipt by 17 June. He alerted all to the probability of a seven-day review period for the second draft

25X1 in order to meet an end of June study completion milestone. The Chairman advised that the SIG(I) would meet on 8 June to review the IG/CI study and, at that time, he expected to determine how critical the end of June milestone was. He acknowledged the diversity of subject matter which encompasses the IG/CM study and the diligence of all concerned in trying to meet the deadline. Mr. Snider observed that the SIG(I) was scheduled to meet again in mid July. []

5. The Chairman turned attention to the four agenda discussion items and asked lead agencies to elaborate:

25X1 a. Industrial Security Policy. Mr. Snider recapitulated the background leading to the proposed NSC industrial security memorandum and solicited member concurrence with the final draft. Minor editorial changes were made in the draft which members had reviewed prior to the meeting. Consensus was reached to transmit the proposed NSC memorandum to the SIG(I) for their review and concurrence. []

25X1 Action: DoD will coordinate final editorial changes and transmit the memorandum from the IG/CM Chairman to the SIG(I). []

25X1 b. Damage Assessment Data Base. The IG/CM Secretariat representative, LTC Waldo Webb, reviewed the Chairman's requirement for members to submit comments on the options paper prepared by the Unauthorized Disclosure Subcommittee of the SECOM. He advised that comments received prior to the meeting had been informally provided for SECOM review and that those comments, along with others provided by members at instant meeting, would be included in a formal memorandum to SECOM. The SECOM Chairman, [] stated that SECOM's efforts to obtain a leak data base seem to differ fundamentally from the IG/CM's desire for a damage assessment data base. He was, therefore, reluctant to accept further tasking on data base development, particularly since he lacked manpower resources. Discussion revealed that focus should be put on clarifying and specifying what elements should be contained in a damage assessment, standardizing how damage assessments will be accomplished, and articulating a policy agreed to by the Community. The Chairman agreed that a draft policy paper would be useful if it emphasized the importance of damage assessments, mandated they be done in appropriate depth, specified the broad elements such assessments should contain, provided for a focal point in each agency to monitor damage assessments to ensure they were done expeditiously and properly, and, when appropriate, ensure that useful information is shared within the Intelligence Community. []

25X1 Action: The Chairman requested SECOM and DoD work jointly to develop a draft policy paper along the lines detailed above.

c. Navy Candidate Issues. Rear Admiral P. W. Dillingham, USN, advised that the five issues proposed by the Navy were generated when the IG/CM was first formed but could possibly still have some merit for present IG/CM consideration. Each issue was examined with the following results:

(1) National Policy on Polygraph: Use of the polygraph in connection with investigations of unauthorized disclosure is currently being considered in the context of the recently issued NSDD-84. []

Action: The IG/CM accepted the issue for monitoring but no specific action at this time. []

(2) National Policy on Anti-Compromise Emergency Destruction (ACED): The Navy opined that a strong policy statement would assist in getting resources for this important program. [] commended the SECOM role to date in providing direction and control to prevent redundancy in the development of subject devices. [] observed that if potential cuts in his Committee's R&D budget take place, SECOM will no longer be able to provide the "seed" money to initiate development of new devices. There was consensus among the membership that while a national policy was not presently required, a strong statement of support from the IG/CM might assist in obtaining recognition and resources for agencies most actively involved in ACED development. The Chairman suggested that such a statement recognize the Navy's pre-eminent role in this area where no single agency has been formally designated, and infer that Navy act as the de facto executive agent for the Government. There was agreement to this suggested approach. []

Action: The IG/CM Secretariat will coordinate the drafting of a statement of support and present it to the membership for review and concurrence. []

(3) National Policy on ADP Security. [] has been chartered to accomplish a comprehensive Intelligence Community-DoD Electronic Information Security Study. []

Action: IG/CM action will be deferred pending the results of the [] study. []

(4) National Policy on Secure Telephones. An important issue but one for which present policy (PD-24) is considered adequate. []

Action: None. []

25X1 (5) Definition of "Unclassified National Security Information". There are many actions under way to deal with the control of unclassified military technology, and no new initiative is considered appropriate.

25X1 Action: None.

25X1 d. NSA Issue: Cryptographic Access Requirements.
reviewed the substance of the NSA paper previously provided to members. He emphasized that in the past, most countermeasure efforts within the COMSEC discipline had concentrated on the SIGINT threat to U.S. COMSEC. He advised that the proposed NSA issue focuses on the HUMINT threat to crypto systems, and strongly recommended reinstitution of an updated Cryptographic Access Program. Discussion on the cost/benefit aspects of such a program followed.

25X1 Action: The Chairman requested IG/CM members provide the Secretariat their agency written comments on the NSA paper. Comments are requested by 30 June 1983.

6. The Chairman alerted attendees to a probable call to an IG/CM meeting on 28 June 1983 for purposes of final concurrence on the IG/CM organizational study. The Secretariat will advise the membership of a firm meeting date as soon as circumstances permit.

7. The meeting adjourned at 1600 hours.

25X1 NOTE: Meeting date will not be 28 June, but will be held 7 July 1983, 1400 hours, Rm. 6W02

ATTENDEES

IG/CM Meeting, 3 June 1983
Room 6744, Department of Justice

NAME

ORGANIZATION

Richard G. Stilwell, Chairman
L. Britt Snider
Edwin Yee

OSD

FBI

CIA

CIA

CIA

CIA

State

State

NSA

NSA

NSC

DIA

Army

Navy

Navy

Air Force

SECOM

SECOM

Justice

Justice

Treasury

Commerce

Energy

Donald Macdonald
Royal M. Wharton

Kenneth deGraffenreid

Donald Press

P. W. Dillingham

G. L. Berkin

George W. Paseur

Robert Leidenheimer

Ed Cohen

Mary C. Lawton

A. R. Cinquegrana

J. Robert McBrien

Robert C. Massey

Robert Wingfield

IC Staff Attendees

IG/CM Staff

IG/CM Staff

CCIS/ICS

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CCIS/ICS:WWebb:dmf:6477 or 37593

Distribution of Draft Minutes of Fifth Meeting of IG/CM (D/ICS-83-0689):

- 1 - Gen. Stilwell, OSD
- 5 - Mr. Snider, OSD (to be distributed to Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps)
- 1 - Mr. Du Hadway, FBI
- 1 - [redacted] CIA
- 1 - Mr. Macdonald, State
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - Mr. deGraffenreid, NSC
- 1 - [redacted] (for JCS)
- 1 - Mr. Leidenheimer, SECOM
- 1 - Ms. Lawton, DoJ
- 1 - Mr. Cinquegrana, DoJ
- 1 - Mr. McBrien, Treasury
- 1 - Mr. Peterson, Commerce
- 1 - Mr. Wingfield, Energy
- 1 - DCI
- 1 - DDCI
- 1 - EXDIR
- 1 - D/ICS and DD/ICS
- 1 - [redacted] OPBS/ICS
- 1 - [redacted] ICG/CRES/DI
- 1 - ICS Registry
- 1 - IG/CM subject
- 1 - IG/CM chrono

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C O N F I D E N T I A L